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MAPPING COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
MIGUEL SCHOR∗ 
In that Empire, the craft of Cartography attained such Perfection 
that the Map of a Single province covered the space of an entire 
City, and the Map of the Empire itself an entire Province. In the 
course of Time, these Extensive maps were found somehow 
wanting, and so the College of Cartographers evolved a Map of the 
Empire that was of the same Scale as the Empire and that coincided 
with it point for point. Less attentive to the Study of Cartography, 
succeeding Generations came to judge a map of such Magnitude 
cumbersome, and, not without Irreverence, they abandoned it to the 
Rigours of sun and Rain. In the western Deserts, tattered Fragments 
of the Map are still to be found, Sheltering an occasional Beast or 
beggar; in the whole Nation, no other relic is left of the Discipline 
of Geography.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Comparative scholars have long been drawn to the possibility of 
mapping the world’s legal systems.2 Maps, after all, are used to 
conceptualize the world. Similarly, scholars believe that order can be 
brought to the profusion of laws that populate the world by classifying and 
organizing them into families. Taxonomies, it is thought, facilitate the task 
of transferring laws between nations.3 The problem with taxonomic 
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 1. J.A. Suárez Miranda, Travels of Praiseworthy Men (1658), reprinted in JORGE LUIS BORGES, 
A UNIVERSAL HISTORY OF INFAMY 141 (Norman Thomas di Giovanni trans., 1975). 
 2. WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY 136–73 (2000). 
 3. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 
AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 6–9 (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:257 
 
 
 
 
approaches to comparative law, however, is that they obscure the tension 
between representing reality and orienting the user that maps ineluctably 
present.4 Those tensions, moreover, are a rich source of scholarly inquiry. 
If a map that perfectly depicted reality were possible, it might make a good 
story but would be of little use in organizing the world of comparative 
judicial review. 
Rather than seek to depict and classify the profusion of constitutional 
courts that populate the world,5 this Article argues that a different type of 
map is needed that focuses on orienting the user.6 This Article provides a 
map of how scholars conceptualize comparative judicial review by 
exploring the questions they ask and assessing the answers they provide. 
Maps tell us not only something about the world they purport to 
conceptualize but also something about the scholarly imagination. The 
problems that drive comparative inquiry are, after all, conceptual rather 
than geographical.  
Methodological concerns have long been the stock in trade of 
comparative law. Perhaps no field of legal inquiry faces deeper unresolved 
methodological problems.7 A distinct genre of scholarship has arisen that 
bewails the methodological issues that afflict the field.8 The sheer volume 
of scholarship written on methodology attests to a deep underlying unease 
as to what it is that scholars do when they do comparative law.9 The 
 
 
 4. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception 
of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 282–86 (1987). 
 5. Dr. Ann Mavčič, Constitutional/Judicial Review Around the World, http://www.concourts. 
net/comparison.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) (providing one attempt to map and classify the world’s 
constitutional courts).  
 6. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15–27 (2004) (arguing similarly that we 
need new conceptual maps to deal with the issues raised by globalization). 
 7. Martin Shapiro’s observations are acute:  
I think it is fair to say that comparative law had been a somewhat disappointing field. For the 
most part it has consisted of showing that a certain procedural or substantive law of one 
country is similar to or different from that of another. Having made the showing, no one 
knows quite what to do next. 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS vii (1981). 
 8. Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 224 (1999) (noting that a “collective crisis of methodological confidence is 
something of a defining genre of comparative legal scholarship, as each commentator outdoes the next 
with dire critiques of the field and timid solutions for its reconfiguration”). 
 9. Comparative public law scholars also write about methodology, albeit less extensively than 
do their private comparative law brethren. See, e.g., John Bell, Comparing Public Law, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 235 (Andrew Harding & Esin Orucu eds., 2002); 
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet 
eds., 2002); Günter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—Toward a 
Layered Narrative, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 439 (2006); Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125 (2005); THE MIGRATION OF 
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conclusion, therefore, uses the scholarly map developed in this Article to 
offer a brief assessment of how scholars should do comparative 
constitutional law. 
The foundational question scholars ask is about institutional 
emergence. Constitutional judicial review emerged in the United States 
and exploded in importance after World War II. Polities throughout the 
world sought to tame democracy by fashioning courts with the power to 
enforce entrenched bills of rights.10 Part II explores the tension between 
historical and political accounts of this global transformation. This Article 
argues that theories which seek to explain the worldwide expansion of 
judicial review by reducing this phenomenon to the political calculus of 
elites fail to appreciate the complexity of the historical processes that led 
to the flowering of judicial review. There is little doubt that elites play an 
important role in the emergence of institutions.11 The late twentieth 
century, however, witnessed an explosion in citizen demands for 
democracy and for the entrenchment of rights throughout the globe.12 The 
construction of judicial review, in short, rests on both the short-term 
calculations of political actors and on long-term social changes.  
One consequence of this global transformation is that some democratic 
diversity has been lost. Parliamentary supremacy is now a critically 
endangered constitutional species as many of the last holdouts succumbed 
to judicial review.13 Part III examines the consequences of this loss of 
institutional diversity. The really big question scholars ask is whether the 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1 (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006); Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (2006); MARTIN SHAPIRO & 
ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 1 (2002); Mark Tushnet, Comparative 
Constitutional Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1225 (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006); and Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999). 
 10. THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 
1995), and Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND POLITICS (Keith Whittington ed., forthcoming 2008).  
 11. MERILEE S. GRINDLE, AUDACIOUS REFORMS: INSTITUTIONAL INVENTION AND DEMOCRACY 
IN LATIN AMERICA 201–18 (2000) (arguing that elites played a key role in the decision to decentralize 
power in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina in the 1980s). 
 12. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 84 (1998) (noting the important role human rights 
organizations play in shaming governments to improve their human rights records), and LYNN HUNT, 
INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 34 (2007) (arguing that human rights rest on long-term 
changes whereby “ordinary people” gained “new understandings” that enabled them to empathize with 
other human beings).  
 13. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights and Democracy-
Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 815 (2003) (noting the demise of the “Westminster 
model of parliamentary supremacy”). 
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global expansion of judicial review has positive or negative implications 
for democracy.  
Scholarly reaction is sharply split between “liberal enthusiasm” and 
“democratic dismay.”14 If scholarly camps could be reduced to bumper 
stickers, optimistic accounts15 would read: “Don’t let politicians mess with 
the Constitution.” Pessimistic accounts, on the other hand, stress the loss 
in democratic self-governance entailed by the adoption of judicial 
review.16 The bumper sticker for the pessimists would read: “Don’t let 
judges mess with the people’s Constitution.”  
This Article argues that both camps fail to adequately grapple with how 
courts facilitate or erode the values needed for democracy to survive for 
the long haul. Both camps also draw judicial review with too broad a 
brush and ignore important variations in the political accountability of 
courts.17 Some constitutional courts are more accountable than others and 
nearly all constitutional courts are more accountable than the United States 
Supreme Court. The variation in judicial review illustrates that institutions 
are transformed when they spread across national boundaries.18 When 
judicial review expanded throughout the world, the U.S. model of weak 
rules of political accountability was largely rejected in favor of stronger 
mechanisms of political accountability for constitutional courts.19 
 
 
 14. Lisa Hilbink, Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New Constitutionalism, 65 MD. L. REV. 
15, 15 (2006). 
 15. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 
(1997); MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 191 (1989); 
RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN: WHY BRITISH LIBERTY NEEDS PROTECTING 
(1990); Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE 
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 58–59 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. 
Rosenthal eds., 1989); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 248 (2000). Michael Corrado’s recent casebook on comparative judicial review 
also looks positively on the demise of parliamentary supremacy. MICHAEL LOUIS CORRADO, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW: CASES AND MATERIALS ix (2005) (“If the book has a 
theme, it is the moving nature of the subject matter.”). 
 16. ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 15 (2003); MARY 
ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 6 (1991); RAN 
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 214 (2004); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 232–35 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2003); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 1346 (2006). 
 17. Cf. PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 3–4 (Scott Mainwaring & 
Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997) (criticizing scholars who fail to take institutional variation into 
account when analyzing presidentialism in Latin America). 
 18. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD 
OF NATIONALISM 155–56 (1996) (arguing that political templates change when one nation copies them 
from another).  
 19. Miguel Schor, Squaring the Circle: Democratizing Judicial Review and the Counter-
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Institutions are not bodily transplanted as some scholars urge,20 but 
undergo important transformations when they spread across borders since 
accommodations must be reached with local power holders.21  
While judicial review has not been transplanted anywhere, it has 
proliferated throughout the globe. The world’s polities exhibit a riot of 
institutional diversity that is the direct consequence of the political 
domestication of judicial review. Part IV examines the two very different 
tacks scholars take in seeking to explain the rich diversity of judicial 
review. Academic lumpers look at the complexity of the social world and 
see important commonalities in judicial review throughout the world. 
Splitters, on the other hand, explore why judicial review has taken 
divergent paths in different polities. Both lumpers and splitters, however, 
are engaged in a common enterprise that seeks to lay bare the foundations 
of constitutionalism.  
II. THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION 
“[W]hy do so many people, in so many parts of the world entrust so 
much of their governance to judges?”22 
Judicial review began paradoxically in a country that failed to write 
this power into its constitution.23 The origin of judicial review in the 
United States is not well understood because it has become the stuff of 
myth.24 Marbury v. Madison is remembered today as establishing judicial 
 
 
Constitutional Difficulty, 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 61, 70–72 (2007). 
 20. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 22 (1974).  
 21. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: 
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 5 (2002) 
(“[W]e wish to renew attention to what the existing critics and the proponents [of law and 
development] tend to neglect: the place of law in specific national contexts to which the law is 
exported or imported.”); Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin 
America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 27–30 (2006) (arguing that the desire of elites to deal with the problem 
of underdevelopment in Latin America transformed constitutions so that they facilitated dictatorship 
rather than republican government).  
 22. Martin Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 193, 218 (Sally Kenney et al. eds., 1999). 
 23. Although any post-1787 constitution maker would have to decide whether to incorporate 
judicial review explicitly into the written constitution, this design decision has not proven dispositive. 
Judicial review is clearly something in the post-1787 constitutional air and it has proven difficult to 
prevent courts from assuming this power. The failure to adopt a written constitution did not stop the 
Israeli Supreme Court from concluding that it had the power of judicial review. CA 6821/93 United 
Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221. The failure to adopt a bill of rights did 
not prevent the Australian High Court from finding that there were rights based limits on Parliament’s 
power. Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106. 
 24. Barry Friedman, The Myths of Marbury, in ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON 65 (Mark 
Tushnet ed., 2005). 
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review and as the fountainhead of judicial protection of individual rights.25 
Neither belief is well founded. Marbury did not found judicial review 
because the practice was well established before the case was decided,26 
and because the framers understood that the Court would exercise this 
power.27 Marbury did not become a famous case, moreover, until the latter 
part of the nineteenth century when the Supreme Court first began to flex 
its power of judicial review.28 When the Court came under attack during 
the Lochner era, “[p]roponents of judicial review . . . seized upon the 
Marbury decision and its author, Chief Justice John Marshall, to legitimize 
their claims for expansive conception of the doctrine.”29 The case grew in 
importance during the twentieth century as the Court increasingly cited it 
in controversial decisions to buttress its legitimacy. Nor is Marbury the 
source of judicial protection of rights. The Bill of Rights was, after all, a 
constitutional afterthought designed to win support for the Constitution.30 
Constitutional rights were not protected by the federal government against 
state encroachment until the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 
1868.31 The Supreme Court did not seriously take up the invitation to 
enforce individual rights until after World War II.32  
Judicial review was designed to knit the nation together by 
counterbalancing the pressures exerted by federalism. The framers 
understood that the national government needed a mechanism that would 
 
 
 25. Alexander Bickel played an important role in perpetuating this myth by claiming that 
Marshall single handedly fashioned judicial review out of the “constitutional vapors” in Marbury. 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 1–4 (1962).  
 26. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 504 
(2006) (arguing that judicial review “arose from a longstanding English corporate practice under which 
a corporation’s ordinances were reviewed for repugnancy to the laws of England”); William M. 
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005) (arguing that judicial 
review was well established before Marbury was decided). 
 27. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1031, 1047 (1997). 
 28. Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: the Emergence of a 
“Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003). 
 29. Id. at 377. 
 30. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 315–32 (2005); STANLEY 
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800 
58–64 (1993). 
 31. State courts, on the other hand, could and did play a role in enforcing the federal bill of rights 
against state government. Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
 32. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 182 (2000); CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 45–69 (1998); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY & 
SANFORD LEVINSON, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (4th ed. 2004). 
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bind the states to the Constitution. The Supreme Court and the Supremacy 
Clause were intended to prevent centrifugal forces from tearing the new 
nation apart: “[u]ndisputedly, judicial review, conceived as a mechanism 
for federalism, was palpably and unequivocally a fundamental element of 
the original intention of the Constitution with the Supremacy Clause as its 
trumpet.”33 The Supreme Court was the “central government’s first line of 
defense against the excesses of individual states.”34 The American 
experience suggests an affinity between judicial review and federalism. It 
is no accident that courts gain power when authority is divided. The more 
important lesson, though, is that “clusters of institutions [tend] to appear 
together throughout history” and the “relative success of one institution 
may be intimately tied to the presence and success of another, partner 
institution.”35  
The United States was not the only new nation in the Americas to 
experiment with written constitutions and judicial review. Most accounts 
of the rise of judicial review ignore the experience of Latin America 
because it is difficult to construct a triumphalist narrative for Marbury 
abroad given the difficulties the region experienced in instituting 
democracy.36 Once Spain’s colonies gained independence, they 
unsurprisingly looked north for constitutional models. The prestige that 
the United States enjoyed made an American-style constitution with 
judicial review a compelling model for constitution writers to emulate 
throughout the region.37 As a consequence, the U.S. model of diffuse 
review, which does not rely on specialized courts to exercise judicial 
review, proved more successful in Latin America than elsewhere.38 
 
 
 33. Rakove, supra note 27, at 1047. 
 34. AMAR, supra note 30, at 211. 
 35. CINDY SKACH, BORROWING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN WEIMAR 
GERMANY AND THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC 128 (2005). 
 36. The historical experience of Latin America has unfortunately been marginalized from 
scholarly treatment of constitutionalism, nationalism, democratization, and social science theory 
building. Schor, Constitutionalism, supra note 21; ANDERSON, supra note 18; DEMOCRACY IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LATIN AMERICA (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1999); THE OTHER MIRROR: 
GRAND THEORY THROUGH THE LENS OF LATIN AMERICA (Miguel Centeno & Fernando López-Alves 
eds., 2001). 
 37. Robert J. Kolesar, North American Constitutionalism and Spanish America: A Special Lock 
Ordered by Catalogue which Arrived with the Wrong Instruction and No Keys?, in AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD: SELECTED ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 41 
(George A. Billios ed., 1990); Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States 
and its Failure in Latin America: an Explanation, 22 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 4, 24 (1990); Schor, 
Constitutionalism, supra note 21. 
 38. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 156–67 (1989); 
Patricio Navia & Julio Ríos, The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America, 38 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 189–90 (2005).  
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Although judicial review failed to preserve constitutions from centrifugal 
forces in the region,39 it did play a role in stabilizing regimes whose 
democratic credentials were questionable.40 The Latin American 
experience illustrates that even borrowed institutions, such as written 
constitutions and judicial review, may function when planted in alien soil, 
albeit in a fashion that was not envisioned by their designers. The 
governments of the region were highly centralized,41 however, which 
meant that courts were marginalized from power. The power of courts to 
ameliorate political conflict diminishes when authority is concentrated. 
The spread of judicial review before World War II outside of Latin 
America also supports the thesis that federalism is positively correlated 
with the success of judicial review. Polities where judicial review was 
effective before World War II—Austria,42 Canada,43 Switzerland,44 and the 
United States45—were federal republics. Federalism was an important 
condition for judicial review to flourish, because the member states of a 
federal government had an interest in ensuring that there is an entity with 
the power to police the bargain they made. In short, federalism drove the 
early expansion of judicial review, not concerns over effectuating rights.46  
The Second World War was a watershed in the expansion of judicial 
review for two reasons. First, the nations of continental Europe adopted 
judicial review after having long resisted granting courts this power 
because it was thought to be incompatible with parliamentary 
supremacy.47 Although there were written constitutions and bills of rights 
 
 
 39. The nineteenth century was highly tumultuous in Latin America as dictators or “caudillos” 
rather than constitutions provided the true source of power. DAVID BUSHNELL & NEILL MACAULEY, 
THE EMERGENCE OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994). 
 40. Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico, 32 J. 
LATIN AM. STUD. 705 (2000); Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of 
U.S. Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite’s 
Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1484 (1997); Matthew C. Mirow, Marbury in Mexico: Judicial 
Review’s Precocious Southern Migration, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcoming 2008).  
 41. BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY: REGIMES OF EXCEPTION IN SPANISH 
AMERICA (1993) and CLAUDIO VÉLIZ, THE CENTRALIST TRADITION OF LATIN AMERICA (1980). 
 42. Stanley L. Paulson, Constitutional Review in the United States and Austria: Notes on the 
Beginnings, 16 RATIO JURIS 223 (2003); Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative 
Study of the Austrian and American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183 (1942). 
 43. Jennifer Smith, The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada, 16 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 1 (1983). 
 44. Mauro Cappelletti & John Clarke Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European 
Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1207–08 (1966) and Michael Crommelin, 
Intergovernmental Relations: Dispute Resolution in Federal Systems, 53 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 139 (2001). 
 45. Rakove, supra note 27. 
 46. SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 9, at 149–83; Ginsburg, supra note 10. 
 47. Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of 
“Constitutional Justice,” 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1985) and TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 1–2 (2006). 
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in Europe before World War II, they were not judicially enforceable.48 
Parliament represented the will of the people, and could not, therefore, be 
checked by the judiciary. The “constitutional revolution” that occurred 
after the war came from the belief that constitutions “need judicial 
machinery to be made effective.”49 Since popularly elected institutions 
failed to prevent the rise of tyranny, it was hoped that an entrenched 
constitution safeguarded by a constitutional court would better safeguard 
democracy.  
Second, rights, rather than federalism or separation of power concerns, 
became the driving force behind the expansion of judicial review.50 The 
most important post-war constitution is Germany’s Basic Law, and it has 
proven highly influential with scholars51 and constitution designers.52 The 
architecture of Germany’s Constitution exhibits a dramatic break with the 
U.S. constitution in terms of the role that rights play. Rights no longer tag 
along behind the organic powers of government but are placed 
prominently at the beginning of Germany’s Basic Law. Article 1 provides: 
“[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the 
duty of all state authority.”53 Although the term “dignity” lacks a clear, 
undisputed meaning, modern jurists see it as the cornerstone of all other 
rights.54 The key elements of German constitutionalism are  
the binding force of basic rights, the protection of the free 
democratic order, the renunciation of any constitutional amendment 
 
 
 48. Favoreu, supra note 15. 
 49. Cappelletti, supra note 47, at 6. 
 50. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Courts: a Primer for Decision Makers, 17 J. 
DEMOCRACY 127 (2006) (noting that judicial review has grown in importance “largely to enforce 
guarantees of human rights”). The importance of rights in the construction of the post-war order is 
evidenced by the successful struggle to incorporate rights into the United Nations charter. PAUL 
GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 168–93 (2d ed. 2003). For a 
more skeptical view of the role of rights in driving the expansion of judicial review, see Shapiro, supra 
note 22. There are outliers, however, where the expansion of judicial power after World War II was 
not driven by a concern for rights. The adoption of judicial review in France, for example, was 
originally driven by separation of power concerns in France’s new semi-presidential form of 
government. JOHN S. BELL & L. NEVILLE BROWN, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (1998). The 
French Constitutional Court soon asserted, however, that it had the power to effectuate rights that 
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that would erode the essential principles of the political system . . . 
or the concept of human dignity laid down in Article 1, and the 
special role of the Federal Constitutional Court as guardian of the 
constitutional order.55 
The German Constitutional Court, in short, was given the job of protecting 
rights to cement the transition to democracy. The influence of the German 
constitutional experience helped move rights to the center of the judicial 
agenda after World War II.  
The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed dramatic 
examples of liberalization, primarily in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America.56 It also witnessed the expansion of judicial review from the 
United States and Western Europe to democracies that had long resisted 
constitutionalized rights57 and to corners of the globe with troubled human 
rights records.58 Reformers throughout the world hoped that 
constitutionalized rights would prove effective in implementing 
democratic transitions and dealing with authoritarian legacies.59 
Academics brushed up and modernized the notion of the rule of law to 
incorporate constitutional judicial review and argued that exporting the 
 
 
 55. Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 839 
(1991).  
 56. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (1991) and GUILLERMO O’DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (1986). 
 57. Three of the last bastions of parliamentary supremacy—Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom—adopted bills of rights near the end of the twentieth century but sought to do so in a 
manner that preserves a role for the legislature in construing rights. Stephen Gardbaum, The New 
Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2001). Parliamentary supremacy 
in Australia, on the other hand, was undermined via judicial interpretation. JASON L. PIERCE, INSIDE 
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& Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Sharia Threaten Human Rights? How 
Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 379 (2006); Rett Ludwikowski, Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Latin America and the 
Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 6 (2004); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE 
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19 (2007); H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of 
Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1240, 1241 (2006); Ángel R. Oquendo, 
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rule of law would cure the developing world’s manifest ills.60 The 
expansion of judicial review after World War II, in short, suggests a strong 
affinity between judicial review and human rights. 
Scholars disagree, however, on why the “world seems to have been 
seized by a craze for constitutionalization and judicial review.”61 One view 
discounts the importance of rights and stresses the role of elites who fear 
losing political power and favor, therefore, empowering courts as a second 
best choice in an uncertain political environment.62 The elite-centered 
account comes in two flavors, one darkly realist, the other more 
democratically hopeful. Ran Hirschl’s Toward Juristocracy: The Origins 
and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism is darkly realist.63 He 
argues that elites are threatened by demands from below by groups long 
marginalized from power. Elites favor empowering courts because they 
fear democracy and believe that courts will protect their interests. The 
“craze” for judicial review is the “result of a strategic tripartite pact 
between hegemonic, yet increasingly threatened, political elites seeking to 
insulate their policy preferences from the vicissitudes of democratic 
politics; economic elites who share a commitment to free markets . . .; and 
supreme courts seeking to enhance their symbolic power.”64  
Tom Ginsburg’s Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional 
Courts in Asian Cases provides a democratically sunnier view of the role 
that elites play in empowering courts.65 He agrees with Hirschl that elites 
favor judicial review when they fear losing power. Ginsburg’s account is 
more democratically optimistic than Hirschl’s because Ginsburg sees 
judicial review as a key building block in the construction of democracy.66 
In particular, polities are more likely to adopt judicial review when power 
is diffuse:  
I argue that the answer to the question of why self-interested 
politicians would design a system of judicial review depends on the 
prospective power positions of constitutional designers in post-
constitutional government . . . [b]y serving as an alternative forum 
in which to challenge governmental action, judicial review provides 
 
 
 60. Miguel Schor, The Rule of Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND 
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 61. HIRSCHL, supra note 16. 
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a form of insurance to prospective electoral losers during the 
constitutional bargain.67 
Ginsburg calls this the insurance model of judicial review: the more 
diffuse political power is, the more likely a polity is to adopt judicial 
review.  
Other scholars stress the role of ordinary citizens rather than elites in 
explaining the expansion of judicial review.68 The citizen-oriented account 
also comes in two flavors: one stresses domestic factors, the other 
international factors. Charles Epp in The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, 
Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective observes that a 
number of polities began to articulate and protect individual rights in the 
sixties.69 He argues that courts expanded their protection of rights because 
of pressure from below by citizens who engaged in “deliberate, strategic 
organizing.”70 The rights revolution, moreover, is democratic as courts 
cannot make law without a stream of cases being brought for adjudication. 
Epp concludes “[t]he basic lesson of this study is that rights are not gifts: 
they are won through concerted collective action arising from both a 
vibrant civil society and public subsidy.”71  
Heinz Klug in Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South 
Africa’s Political Representation agrees with Epp that ordinary citizens 
play a key role in empowering courts but, unlike Epp, Klug stresses 
international factors.72 White elites in South Africa favored judicial 
empowerment since they knew that they would lose political power in a 
democratic transition. Surprisingly, black South Africans, who were 
poised to gain political power, also supported the constitutionalization of 
rights. International human rights norms played a key role in mobilizing 
opposition to apartheid domestically and abroad, which explains the broad 
support given the new constitution and constitutional court. Although the 
decision to adopt a justiciable constitution would limit the power of 
political majorities in the newly constituted South Africa, it also contained 
a number of “mechanisms designed to address the legacy of apartheid. 
Among the mechanisms were constitutional protection for state policies of 
affirmative action; provisions for the restitution of land as well as specific 
 
 
 67. Id. at 24–25. 
 68. EPP, supra note 32; HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM, AND 
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protections for land reform; and also the introduction of socio-economic 
rights as justiciable rights.”73 The creation of the South African 
Constitutional Court played an important role in the democratic transition 
as well. There was a shared faith that the judiciary would be an important 
player in “mediating the construction of a post-apartheid political order.”74 
Klug concludes that the “turn to judicial review involves a move towards 
the civilization of potentially unnegotiable conflicts.”75 
The debate over the current “craze” in favor of judicial review reflects 
a wider debate over democratization. One view stresses the role of elites in 
crafting democracy.76 The other view stresses long-term factors such as the 
rise of social classes that can demand democracy from below.77 The elite-
centered account argues that democracy emerges when elites first learn the 
“rules, practices, and the culture of competitive politics” before suffrage is 
widened.78 Oligarchy today, democracy tomorrow works because 
“[t]olerance and mutual security are more likely to develop among a small 
elite sharing similar perspectives than among a large and heterogeneous 
collection of leaders representing social strata with widely varying goals, 
interests, and outlooks.”79 Accounts that stress the importance of social 
structures, on the other hand, emphasize that democracy is the result of 
long-term factors. Economic development plays a key role as 
“industrialization transformed society in a fashion that empowered 
subordinate classes and made it difficult to politically exclude them.”80 
The key to democracy is a balance of social forces that facilitates the 
negotiation needed for democracy to work. 
Perhaps the best attempt to synthesize the opposing views of how 
democracy is formed is Charles Tilly’s argument that democracy 
resembles a lake. Both are formed “in a variety of ways” and retain “traces 
of [their] singular history in the details of [their] current operation.”81 The 
 
 
 73. Id. at 124. 
 74. Id. at 179. 
 75. Id. at 180. 
 76. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 36 (1971); Larry Diamond 
et al., Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America, in DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
supra note 36, at 1; O’DONNELL & SCHMITTER, supra note 56. 
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point is that democracy requires both the crafting of institutions and the 
construction of the attitudes needed to sustain democracy. The former are 
short-term processes whereas the latter are long-term. Elite-centered 
accounts posit that judicial review is the result of short-term factors such 
as bargaining. Citizen-oriented accounts, on the other hand, posit that 
judicial review rests on long-term, societal transformations. This Article 
argues that a combination of long-term and short-term factors is needed to 
produce healthy lakes, happy democracies, and successful judicial review. 
However judicial review emerges, it cannot be successful for the long-
term without some form of separation of powers or alternation in power 
between different parties and citizen support for rights. 
Although lakes, democracies, and judicial review are created in a 
number of ways, once formed they exhibit a number of important 
regularities that scholars can explore. Judicial review has become one of 
the institutional regularities that democracies exhibit. Democracies 
throughout the world have opted to judicialize constitutions. The really big 
question, therefore, is whether empowering courts to construe 
constitutions has a democratic pay-off. 
III. THE BIG QUESTION 
[T]his much I think I do know—that a society so riven that the spirit 
of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society where that 
spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a society which evades 
its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that 
spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.82 
With the demise of parliamentary supremacy, judicial review has 
(almost) conquered democracy. The really big question is what are the 
consequences of this global transformation. There are two competing 
views on the role of courts in a democracy that rest on different 
foundational myths. One view traces its intellectual lineage to the Warren 
Court, and particularly to Brown v. Board of Education, in painting a 
heroic picture of courts.83 Judicial optimists look at the experience of 
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newer, transitional democracies to argue that judicial review has an 
important democratic payoff. The competing view hearkens back to the 
Lochner era when the Court sought to derail progressive reforms and takes 
a more jaundiced view of courts.84 Judicial pessimists argue that 
constitutional courts weaken democracy by looking primarily at the record 
of older, consolidated democracies. Neither judicial optimists nor judicial 
pessimists, however, do a particularly good job of elucidating the complex 
relationship between judicial review and the construction or erosion of the 
societal attitudes that sustain democracy for the long haul. 
Scholars who believe that courts play a heroic role in effectuating 
democracy draw their insights from democratic transitions. Mauro 
Cappelletti, for example, examined the democratic transitions that 
occurred after World War II to argue that courts play an important role in 
effectuating “constitutional justice.”85 The nations of continental Europe 
drew on their “domestic experience of tyranny and oppression unchecked 
by law” to conclude that constitutions “need judicial machinery to be 
made effective.”86 It is difficult to believe, however, that the lack of 
effective judicial machinery played an important role in Europe’s fall into 
totalitarianism.87  
Judicial optimists are on stronger ground when they argue that courts 
can play a role in facilitating democratic transitions. Bruce Ackerman, for 
example, argues that the success of the German Constitutional Court flows 
from the sociological fact that the Basic Law has become a “central 
symbol of the nation’s break with its Nazi past.”88 The transitions to 
democracy that occurred primarily in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century provide further grist for the judicial optimists’ mill. The difficulty 
that these new democracies are experiencing in consolidating democracy, 
however, has led to a more nuanced view of the role that constitutional 
courts play in constructing democracy. Herman Schwartz, for example, 
reprises Cappelletti’s themes in The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in 
Post-Communist Europe and concludes modestly that while constitutional 
courts cannot implement liberty, they can “help to maintain, nurture, and 
perhaps even to strengthen it.”89 
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Judicial pessimists, on the other hand, draw their lessons from well-
established, consolidated democracies.90 The pessimists make three 
arguments: (1) institutional competence; (2) democratically suspect 
outcomes; and (3) democratic debilitation.  
First, Jeremy Waldron argues vigorously that legislatures can do as 
good a job as courts in effectuating rights by examining parliamentary 
debates on liberalizing abortion, legalizing adult homosexual conduct, and 
abolishing capital punishment in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand.91 He observes that the “quality of those debates . . . 
make nonsense of the claim that legislators are incapable of addressing 
such issues responsibly.”92 Judges, on the other hand, are hampered in 
protecting rights because they must filter the moral and policy issues 
involved through the language found in bills of rights and precedent.  
Second, Ran Hirschl observes that polities may have vigorous judicial 
protection of rights yet suffer from income inequality as “its influence on 
promoting progressive notions of distributive justice has been 
exaggerated.”93 Issues of income and education are thought to “lie beyond 
the reach of constitutional rights as currently interpreted by national high 
courts.”94 The United States, for example, has vigorous judicial review and 
“vast social and economic disparity” when compared to other advanced 
industrial nations. Norway and Sweden, on the other hand, enjoy an 
egalitarian “democracy while being less than enthusiastic (to put it mildly) 
about the American notions of rights and judicial review.”95  
Third, Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet worry that vigorous judicial 
review in the United States has undermined the societal attitudes needed to 
sustain democracy.96 Kramer concludes that the United States has fallen 
from grace by contrasting the virtuous world of the founders where 
citizens were “responsible for interpreting fundamental law” with the 
current situation where citizens are marginalized in construing and 
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effectuating the Constitution because the Supreme Court has usurped that 
power.97 Tushnet wants to do away with judicial review because it 
hampers the development of a robust constitutional culture where citizens 
can discuss the values that constitute the nation in the ordinary venues of 
politics. 
The core of the judicial pessimists’ argument is that courts are not 
needed to effectuate rights and lack democratic legitimacy.98 There are no 
signs, however, that the tide in favor of judicial review is rolling back.99 
Democracy, for better or worse, is stuck with judicial review. The 
argument that courts are anti-democratic while legislatures represent the 
people, moreover, paints with too broad a brush. Courts are more 
democratic than the pessimists believe for two reasons. First, courts cannot 
make policy unless citizens mobilize to effectuate rights.100 Courts without 
a substratum of citizen support are powerless. Second, the example of the 
United States Supreme Court plays too large a role in the judicial 
pessimists’ imagination. Perhaps no court is as free of democratic 
constraints as is the Supreme Court. The framers failed to take into 
account the problem of political accountability when designing the Court 
because they mistakenly thought that courts do not make policy. After all, 
there was little to fear from the least dangerous branch as it exercised 
neither force nor will.101 When other polities turned their attention to 
designing constitutional courts after World War II, they learned from the 
U.S. experience and fashioned stronger mechanisms of political 
accountability.102 Those mechanisms include term limits and 
 
 
 97. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 24. 
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supermajority appointment provisions103 as well as devices that make it 
easier for democratic forces to overrule constitutional decisions.104 When 
judicial review expanded in the latter part of the twentieth century, it was 
democratized by strengthening the mechanisms of popular control.105  
Optimists and pessimists, moreover, fail to adequately deal with 
whether judicial review facilitates or erodes the values needed to sustain 
democracy for the long haul. Judge Learned Hand’s skepticism as to the 
importance of judicial review is somewhat heretical for a judge, but he 
was certainly right that citizen beliefs and attitudes play an important role 
in the success or failure of institutions.106 It is instructive to contrast the 
role that constitutions sometimes play in the construction of attitudes 
needed to sustain democracy with the role that judicial review plays. There 
is little doubt that constitutions may play an important role in forging the 
attitudes needed to fashion democracy.107 Social movements can and do 
arise to protest the distance they perceive between political and social 
practices and constitutional guarantees. Such activity can, in turn, 
strengthen the social bases of democracy.108 Constitutions, moreover, 
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Constitution is one of the most difficult to amend in the world. Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of 
Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). The legislative override, which has 
been adopted in Canada, is another mechanism. Constitution Act, 1982, Canada Act (Eng.), pt. 1 § 33. 
 105. Schor, Squaring the Circle, supra note 19. 
 106. CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 81 (Lawrence E. Harrison & 
Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC 
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 3 (1993). 
 107. The democratic transitions that occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989 provide a powerful 
example of the transformative power of human rights. The Soviet Union recognized the principles of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as part of the Helsinki agreement which was signed in 
1975. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 188 (2005). The agreement emboldened 
dissidents throughout Eastern Europe who used rights rooted in international law to critique and 
eventually topple the dictatorships in the region. Id. at 188–93. See generally LAUREN, supra note 50. 
Human rights unsettle not only authoritarian regimes but also deeply-rooted authoritarian legacies in 
democracies. Racial and gender inequality in the United States has been undermined by social 
movements whose claims are based on constitutional language. Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & 
Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1338 (1995); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: the Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
 108. Americans over the course of history have made the constitution an institution with deep 
social roots by engaging in “constitutional struggles.” In so doing, they forged a shared consciousness 
of rights. Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and ‘The Rights That Belong to Us All,’ 74 J. 
AM. HIST. 1013, 1014 (1987). Gordon Wood, for example, argues that the American revolution was a 
social movement that radically transformed American society:  
The revolutionaries aimed at nothing less than a reconstitution of American society. They 
hoped to destroy the bonds holding together the older monarchical society—kinship, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] MAPPING COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 275 
 
 
 
 
provide an important safety valve since losers in the political arena can use 
the broad language of rights to claim that their position will be vindicated 
in the future. Constitutions, in short, can deepen the social bases of 
democracy.109  
The impact of judicial review is different. The long-term consequence 
of judicial review is that citizens realize that there is a payoff to playing 
the game of constitutional politics.110 Citizens seek to influence the output 
of courts by engaging in strategic litigation111 and influencing the 
appointments of judges.112 The problem with using courts to achieve 
strategic aims, as the historical experience of the United States amply 
demonstrates, is that this can be a divisive road for a polity to follow. The 
politics that have swirled around Roe v. Wade may prove to be the norm 
once polities adopt judicial review. By relying on courts to achieve 
constitutional ends, the interest group activity that clusters around 
constitutional politics may tend to amplify and deepen societal 
divisions.113 Courts, absent the support of broad social movements, cannot 
transform public opinion. 
IV. LUMPERS AND SPLITTERS 
Can a people born equal ever understand others, can it ever 
understand itself?114  
 
 
patriarchy, and patronage—and to put in their place new social bonds of love, respect, and 
consent. They sought to construct a society and governments based on virtue and 
disinterested public leadership and to set in motion a moral movement that would eventually 
be felt around the globe. 
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Comparative law is “broadly defined as the study of how and why legal 
systems differ or are the same.”115 Depending on whether differences or 
similarities are emphasized, comparative law scholarship can be divided 
into two approaches. Lumpers look at the brave new world of judicial 
review and see commonalities rather than differences. Splitters, on the 
other hand, look at the same constitutional landscape and argue that the 
differences jut out more prominently than do the commonalities.  
The two major comparative constitutional law casebooks illustrate how 
these two approaches differ. Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, András 
Sajó, and Susanne Baer’s Comparative Constitutionalism begins by asking 
what is a constitution and provides, therefore, an example of lumping.116 
Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tushnet’s Comparative Constitutional Law, on 
the other hand, provides an example of splitting, as it starts with the 
dramatically different answers to abortion provided by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Canadian Supreme Court, and the German 
Constitutional Court.117 
In seeking to understand comparative judicial review, lumpers and 
splitters grapple with the following phenomenon: courts around the world 
increasingly cite each other’s opinions. Scholars use a number of 
problematic terms in seeking to describe this phenomenon. “Borrowing” 
has long been the term of art used to describe the use of foreign legal 
material.118 The problem with the term borrowing is that it suggests that 
courts transform domestic law by adopting ideas embedded in foreign 
legal sources.119 The reality is quite different as the impact of foreign ideas 
is mediated by local power structures.120  
A number of scholars, most notably Sujit Choudry, champion the use 
of the term “migration” rather than borrowing.121 Using migration to 
describe this phenomenon is clearly an improvement over borrowing as 
migration does not imply that the constitutional rule in question will be 
 
 
 115. Sujit Choudry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 829 (1999). 
 116. NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRÁS SAJÓ, & SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1–98 (2003).  
 117. VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–140 (2d ed. 
2006). In addition to these two comprehensive casebooks, there is a new, shorter work focusing solely 
on judicial review that splits its analysis along national lines. CORRADO, supra note 15. 
 118. Symposium, Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 177 (2003).  
 119. The odd notion that there are no barriers to the spread of legal ideas across national 
boundaries has long been championed by Alan Watson. WATSON, supra note 20. 
 120. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19 (arguing that Western legal prescriptions adopted in Latin 
America were transformed by local power structures). 
 121. Sujit Choudry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1 (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006). 
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well received as it crosses borders. The problem with the term migration is 
that immigrants respond to push and pull factors122 whereas constitutional 
ideas quite obviously are not purposeful actors. Ideas, moreover, travel 
differently than do human actors because the former are more readily 
transformed as they “move” across borders. This Article, therefore, 
describes the intersection between globalization and constitutional 
decision making as the comparative turn by constitutional courts.  
Lumpers and splitters argue over the implications and propriety of the 
comparative turn by courts.123 Lumpers and splitters agree on little, but 
their disagreements illuminate the role that the United States plays in the 
comparative constitutional imagination. Louis Hartz famously questioned 
whether the United States, given its exceptional founding, could 
understand the experience of other liberal democracies.124 It has been both 
a model and an anti-model to all the world’s constitutional democracies.125 
The idea of written rights protected by a court has largely swept the 
world’s democracies. The rules governing the political accountability of 
the United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, have proven a 
contested export. The role that the Court plays in its domestic 
constitutional hierarchy, therefore, is in many key respects dissimilar to 
the role played by other constitutional courts in their domestic 
constitutional orders.126 The issue is whether the importance of the United 
States in the comparative constitutional imagination has clouded our 
understanding of judicial review. This Article argues that our 
understanding of judicial review would be improved if our maps were to 
deemphasize and contextualize the U.S. experience. Scholarly maps of 
judicial review have for too long viewed the world through the prism of 
the exceptional U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
 
 122. See JOSÉ MOYA, COUSINS AND STRANGERS: SPANISH IMMIGRANTS IN BUENOS AIRES, 1850–
1930 (1998), for a seminal discussion and critique of theories of migration. 
 123. Scholars who write about comparative judicial review obviously write about other issues as 
well. This Article focuses on how scholars grapple with the spread of ideas because it illustrates the 
scholarly imagination at work in fashioning conceptual comparative maps. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 
18 (arguing that the spread of nationalism around the world demonstrates how nations are “imagined” 
or conceptualized). 
 124. HARTZ, supra note 114. 
 125. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World 
Constitutionalism,” 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597. 
 126. See infra Part IV.B.  
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A. The Contested Comparative Turn by the United States Supreme Court 
The United States Supreme Court is sharply divided over the propriety 
of citing foreign constitutional sources. This fault line127 is evident in a 
number of recent cases128 and in an extraordinary debate between Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer.129 Justice Scalia clearly sympathized 
with academic splitters when he asked: “[h]ow can a case from another 
nation be relevant given the obvious differences?”130 Justice Breyer 
responded by making an argument that echoes the logic employed by 
academic lumpers. He argued that foreign law is relevant because a judge 
in a democratic society “tries to apply a similar document with similar 
language.”131 The two sides to the debate have radically different notions 
of the legitimacy of the comparative turn by the Court. Justice Scalia 
believes that it is democratically illegitimate to rely on foreign sources in 
interpreting the Constitution. He argues that the Court actually borrows 
foreign ideas when it cites legal material from abroad and, therefore, 
effectively amends the Constitution in light of other people’s values.132 
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, argues that the Court deepens its 
understanding of the American Constitution, rather than amending it in 
accordance with the wishes of foreigners, by considering foreign 
sources.133  
The fault line that runs through the Court is reflected in the explosion 
of scholarship on the topic. Scholars who agree with Justice Scalia believe 
that citing foreign opinions constitutes borrowing and is illegitimate 
 
 
 127. The fault line may well prove an enduring one given that both Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Justice Samuel Alito professed their hostility to citing foreign law in their confirmation hearings. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United 
States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); Confirmation Hearing on 
the Nomination Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be Associate Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006). 
 128. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–77 
(2003); and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997). 
 129. Debate at American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005). A transcript can 
be found at The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: Justice Antonin 
Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 521 (2005).  
 130. Id. at 528. The framers, moreover, argue Justice Scalia, “would have been appalled” if they 
had been told “we’re to be just like Europe.” Id.  
 131. Id. at 529. 
 132. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the Court “should not impose 
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11 (“We think that such 
comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course 
quite relevant to the task of writing one.”). 
 133. Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials, supra note 129, at 523. 
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because it suffers from a democratic deficit.134 Jed Rubenfeld, for example, 
argues that U.S. and European constitutionalism rest on differing baseline 
assumptions of constitutional legitimacy. Europeans place little emphasis 
on the popular provenance of constitutions and believe that constitutions 
are legitimate when they reflect an international consensus.135 Ken Kersch 
criticizes borrowing because a constitution is the key to democratic self-
governance and looking abroad undermines the power of citizens to 
govern themselves.136 He argues that the emergence of a globalized 
constitutional law is a troubling phenomenon because it undermines 
democratic self-rule as losers in the electoral arena turn to a “newly 
autonomous globalized judiciary.”137  
Scholars who agree with Justice Breyer, on the other hand, believe 
world constitutionalism and U.S. constitutionalism are sufficiently related 
that courts can and should cite opinions from abroad.138 Jeremy Waldron, 
for example, argues that there is a common law of mankind consisting of 
those principles that represent “a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, 
and lawmakers around the world.”139 He notes that in areas outside the 
law, it would be inconceivable to reject the wisdom of those beyond our 
borders.140 It would be a mistake to reject this body of wisdom that 
“represents a dense network of checking and rechecking results, 
experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual elaboration, and building 
on one another’s work.”141 Daniel Farber takes aim at the view that 
borrowing is alien to U.S. constitutionalism by arguing that the framers 
were international and comparativist in their outlook. He concludes that 
“foreign law had deeply permeated our legal system from the very 
 
 
 134. Stephen J. Calabresi, “A Shining City on the Hill:” American Exceptionalism and the 
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335 (2006); Kersch, supra 
note 81; John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303 (2006); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 233 (G. Nolte ed., 
2005). 
 135. Rubenfeld, supra note 134, at 233–37. 
 136. Kersch, supra note 83. 
 137. Id. at 348. 
 138. Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: the 
Lessons of History (Dec. 15, 2006). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 954359, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=954359; Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, 
Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the 
Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 132 (2005). 
 139. Waldron, supra note 138. 
 140. Id. at 144. 
 141. Id. at 145. 
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beginning, not only in private law but in constitutional discourse and 
adjudication.”142  
This Article argues that the critics of the comparative turn by the 
United States Supreme Court (1) mistakenly conflate constitutional with 
judicial legitimacy, (2) fail to pay heed to the historical record of 
borrowing by the Court, and (3) misconstrue the relationship between the 
U.S. Constitution and other constitutions around the globe. (1) 
Constitutions, of course, require a democratic provenance to be legitimate. 
When polities around the globe rejected the British model for protecting 
rights in favor of the U.S. model, they decided that judges, not politicians, 
should have the primary task of protecting rights. To argue that courts 
suffer from a democratic deficit is to belabor the obvious. (2) There is no 
doubt, moreover, that the United States Supreme Court has long cited 
foreign legal material.143 In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall 
contrasted the written U.S. Constitution with the unwritten British system 
to argue that courts in polities with written constitutions have the power of 
judicial review.144 Justice Scalia’s view that only certain sources should 
count as law runs counter not only to the historical practice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but also more broadly to the practice of common law 
judges. Common law judges, unlike their civil law brethren, have never 
been constrained by theories that only certain arguments count as law.145 
(3) Lastly, the critics of the comparative turn overly emphasize the U.S. 
founding while largely ignoring the subsequent course of constitutionalism 
around the globe. The United States was exceptional in having entrenched, 
judicially enforceable rights in 1787. Over the course of the last two 
centuries the U.S. model of entrenched rights, protected by courts, has 
become the norm around the globe. The pace of citation of foreign 
authority by the United States Supreme Court has quickened over the past 
half century146 because so many polities adopted judicial review after 
World War II. The real issue is what the comparative turn by courts 
around the world tells us about the course of constitutionalism.  
 
 
 142. Farber, supra note 138. 
 143. Stephen G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources 
of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 743, 755 (2005). 
 144. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). This graceful argument was first made by Professor Jackson. Jackson, 
supra note 138. 
 145. Civil law judges, on the other hand, are taught that the sources of law are limited and 
arranged in an immutable hierarchy. JULIO CUETA RUA, FUENTES DEL DERECHO (1982). LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 1 (illustrates this bedrock, civilian principle by providing that the only authoritative sources 
of law are “legislation and custom.”). 
 146. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 143.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] MAPPING COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 281 
 
 
 
 
B. The Comparative Turn Abroad 
The comparative turn looks very different when our perspective shifts 
from U.S. constitutionalism to world constitutionalism. Other 
constitutional courts routinely cite foreign legal material.147 This strongly 
suggests that the issue is of little importance other than that it reveals an 
ideological fault line running through the U.S. Supreme Court and, to 
some extent, through the American public. Justice Scalia is at the 
vanguard of an ideological movement that seeks to ban comparative law 
from the constitutional lexicon. His critique oddly echoes a French statute 
adopted in the wake of its Revolution that precluded courts from 
exercising judicial review because they were forbidden to make policy.148 
The French deviation149 proved to be an evolutionary dead end since all 
courts engage in some policymaking.150 The U.S. deviation will likely 
prove untenable as well. The development of the Internet and the rise of 
English as a common tongue of constitutionalism are creating a situation 
analogous to the one that led to the reception of Roman law throughout the 
continent of Europe.151 The spread of ideas across national boundaries is 
an inevitable consequence of the forces that drive globalization. South 
Africa’s constitutional provision that its courts, “[w]hen interpreting the 
Bill of Rights . . . may consider foreign law”152 simply codifies what is 
becoming a global judicial practice. 
From a global perspective, the issue is not the propriety of the 
comparative turn but its implications. Scholars disagree whether the 
 
 
 147. Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 
414 (2003) (observing that the use of foreign law by the Canadian Supreme Court is so common “that 
it is difficult to find general statements regarding the use, relevance, or value of such authorities”); 
Donald P. Kommers, American Courts and Democracy: a Comparative Perspective, in THE JUDICIAL 
BRANCH 200 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005) (noting that the German Constitutional 
Court, unlike the United States Supreme Court, lacks factions which believe that certain interpretive 
techniques are illegitimate); Oquendo, supra note 58 (citation of foreign and international legal 
authorities by Latin American constitutional courts is the norm); Saunders, supra note 9 (observing 
that the United States Supreme Court is exceptional among common law nations for its hostility to the 
citation of foreign legal authority). 
 148. Law of 16–24 August 1790 (Fr.) The principle embedded in this law had tremendous 
influence not only in France but also throughout the civil law world. John Henry Merryman, The 
French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109 (1996).  
 149. Merryman, supra note 148. 
 150. This is a point famously made by Benjamin Cardozo when he argued that judges are, at 
bottom, legislators. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112–18 (1921). See 
also David Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 142 (1996) (“The law of the 
constitution, to invoke Dicey’s famous title, turns out to be much more about justification than 
interpretation.”). 
 151. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 3 (1999). 
 152. S. AFR. CONST. § 39 (1996).  
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comparative turn will result in the emergence of a common, global 
constitutional law. Academic lumpers believe that the comparative turn 
will eventually lead to constitutional convergence whereas academic 
splitters believe that constitutional differences will prove enduring. 
Struggles over the influence of foreign ideas on the meaning of domestic 
constitutions can as readily lead to resistance as convergence.153  
Lumpers explain convergence by relying on two different theories: one 
looks to the environment in which judicial review is embedded, the other 
to human agency. David Law looks to environmental factors to conclude 
that a generic constitutional law is emerging.154 The consequence of 
affording courts the power of constitutional judicial review is that they 
must struggle to draw the proper line between law and politics.155 Courts 
need to legitimize their actions when they challenge majoritian actors and 
they look, unsurprisingly, to written constitutions. In grounding their 
decisions on constitutional texts, constitutional courts engage in “generic 
constitutional analysis” even if “every jurisdiction has its own magic 
words” to describe what it is that courts do.156 Generic constitutional 
analysis consists of balancing the interests involved to determine whether 
the limits imposed by the law in question are justified and determining 
whether the legislation is rationally related to the ends it seeks to achieve. 
Law claims that all courts utilize balancing and rationality tests when 
engaging in constitutional judicial review. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter looks to human agency to argue that 
constitutional law is converging.157 Slaughter approvingly observes that 
judges around the world conduct a “dialogue through mutual citation, as 
well as through increasingly direct interactions, both face to face and 
electronic.”158 As a consequence, judges increasingly see themselves as 
part of a “global community” engaged in a common enterprise rather than 
as part of a national community deciding local cases.159 While scholars 
facilitated the diffusion of Roman law throughout the continent of Europe 
 
 
 153. Ireland, for example, has used its national constitution to resist attempts, grounded in 
international and European human rights instruments, to legalize abortion. Gary Jacobsohn, 
Constitutional Identity, 68 REV. POL. 361, 384–91 (2006). 
 154. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 693 (2005). 
 155. The line is drawn differently by different polities. TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW (2003). 
 156. Law, supra note 154.  
 157. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 191, 195 (2003). 
 158. Slaughter, supra note 157. 
 159. Id. at 192. 
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thereby creating the ius commune,160 today judges also play a leading role 
in forging a global community. Judges believe that they can learn from the 
experience of other nations and view the decisions of other constitutional 
courts as “superstar amicus briefs.”161 The South African death penalty 
decision, with its copious citations to decisions from other constitutional 
courts,162 is seen as the harbinger of a new constitutional order. Slaughter 
concludes that what is emerging is not a generic constitutional analysis but 
globalized constitutional norms: “Increasing cross-fertilization of ideas 
and precedents among constitutional judges around the world is gradually 
giving rise to a visible international consensus on various issues—a 
consensus that, in turn, carries compelling weight.”163 
Splitters, on the other hand, point to the deep division in the United 
States Supreme Court over the propriety of the comparative turn to argue 
that constitutional law is not converging.164 The United States was the first 
polity to construct a human rights regime of entrenched rights protected by 
courts. The constitutional systems developed after World War II “differ 
from their [American] precursor” because they “share a sophisticated legal 
paradigm that facilitates . . . comparative engagement.”165 Bills of rights 
abroad, which were adopted in the wake of World War II, are deemed 
legitimate because they are linked to an emerging consensus on 
international human rights norms. Constitutional courts abroad believe that 
they are engaged in a global enterprise that requires that they engage in 
dialogue with courts in other polities.166 The United States, on the other 
hand, grounds the legitimacy of its Bill of Rights on domestic, not 
international, acceptance.167 As a consequence, the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 
 160. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS, AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN 
LEGAL HISTORY 44 (1987); STEIN, supra note 151. 
 161. Slaughter, supra note 157, at 217. 
 162. S v. Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 163. Slaughter, supra note 157, at 202. 
 164. Harding, supra note 147; Weinrib, supra note 83. 
 165. Weinrib, supra note 83, at 84. 
 166. The dialogue theory has been advanced and debated forcefully by Canadian constitutional 
theorists. See generally Symposium, Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 
(2007). The Canadian Supreme Court has rejected the argument that judicial review is illegitimate by 
noting that it is constitutionally required to engage in a dialogue with other actors. Vriend v. Alberta, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, par. 137 (Can.). 
 167. Rubenfeld, supra note 134. This may explain why the United States remains, constitutionally 
speaking, strikingly different from other Western democracies. It is less tolerant of foreign influences 
in interpreting the Constitution and positive economic and social constitutional guarantees, but it is 
more tolerant of hate speech and the death penalty. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).  
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sees itself at the apex of a constitutional pecking order and brooks little 
help from constitutional courts abroad. 
Splitters and lumpers, in short, disagree as to whether a common, 
global constitutional law is emerging. The United States may resist the 
development of a common law of the constitution because its Supreme 
Court believes that it is the sole, legitimate interpreter of the Constitution. 
The American Supreme Court is exceptional not only in its resistance to 
legal ideas that cannot be stamped with a made purely in America label, 
but also in its attitude towards balancing or proportionality. Balancing or 
proportionality is more widely accepted in constitutions adopted after 
World War II than in the United States.168 Modern constitutions recognize 
that courts must balance democracy and rights. Section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, “guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”169 
Proportionality provisions are important because they inform courts that 
legislatures have an important role to play in construing rights. The 
hostility exhibited by the United States Supreme Court towards foreign 
constitutional sources simply reflects, therefore, its broad antipathy 
towards any competition, including from domestic political actors, in 
construing the Constitution.170 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Live in London for a year and you will not get to know much about 
the English. But through comparison, and in the light of your 
surprise, you will suddenly come to understand some of the more 
 
 
 168. Mattias Kumm, What Do You Have in Virtue of Having a Constitutional Right? The Place 
and Limits of Proportionality Analysis, in LAW, RIGHTS, DISCOURSE: THEMES OF THE WORK OF 
ROBERT ALEXY (S. Paulsen & G. Pavlakos eds.) (forthcoming 2008) (arguing that proportionality 
analysis is more firmly embedded in constitutions adopted after World War II); see also Frederick 
Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United States: A Case Study in 
Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 47 (G. Nolte 
ed., 2005).  
 169. Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1, sched. B (Eng.).  
 170. The clearest example of this can be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, where the Court has 
resolutely warded off Congressional attempts to construe its dictates. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See generally Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between 
Judges and Legislators, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 7, 39–47 (2004) (arguing that the strong form of judicial 
review exercised by the United States Supreme Court precludes inter-branch dialogue). 
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profound and individual characteristics of France, which you did 
not previously understand because you knew them too well.171 
Comparative inquiry is an important tool in teasing out the unspoken 
assumptions that inform our understanding of the law.172 The purpose of 
comparative law is ultimately introspective. Although comparative public 
law draws from comparative private law an emphasis on introspective 
inquiry, comparative public law scholarship has been less concerned with 
methodology than has comparative private law scholarship, which is both 
healthy and odd. It is odd because the problem of method looms large in 
comparative public law scholarship since it necessarily deals with issues 
that transcend the law. Constitutions quite obviously do not exist in a 
political vacuum and context, therefore, is central to comparative 
constitutional inquiry. Kim Scheppele is right to argue that comparative 
constitutional analysis should be thick rather than thin.173 The lack of 
interest in methodological niceties has been healthy because it is quite 
possible to push the boundaries of knowledge while ignoring the question 
of how best to make comparisons.174  
Comparative private law has long been enamored of maps of the 
world’s legal systems and of methodological arguments. Comparative 
constitutional law scholarship, on the other hand, is clearly moving on a 
different methodological path. It took shape in response to the expansion 
of judicial power that began after World War II and intensified with the 
wave of democratization that occurred in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century.175 By focusing on what is happening rather than arguing 
over how best to make comparisons, comparative constitutional law has 
made real progress. Comparative constitutional law, moreover, has largely 
ignored the troubled relationship between geography and law that 
historically played such an important role in comparative private law.176 
Rather than drawing maps that divide the world’s democracies into 
families of judicial review, scholars have asked three broad questions: (i) 
 
 
 171. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 520 
(1992) (quoting FERNAND BRAUDEL, HISTOIRE ET SCIENCES SOCIALES: LA LONGUE DURÉE 725, 737 
(1958)). 
 172. James Q. Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS 
AND TRANSITIONS 312 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). 
 173. Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
389 (2004). 
 174. Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002). 
 175. Ginsburg, supra note 10.  
 176. Ugo Mattei has also suggested that taxonomic approaches may be of limited use when 
dealing with problems of democratization. Mattei, supra note 3. 
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why has judicial review (almost) conquered democracy; (ii) whether 
empowering courts to construe constitutions has a democratic payoff; and 
(iii) how best to make sense of the variation that judicial review exhibits 
around the world. 
The map of comparative judicial review scholarship reveals three 
hidden maps, whose illumination is critical to our understanding of the 
global expansion of judicial power. The first is whether the emergence of 
judicial review and the emergence of democracy rest on similar causal 
factors. Students of democracy vigorously debate the relative importance 
of elite bargains and citizen demands, whereas the leading scholarly 
accounts of judicial review discount the importance of citizens and 
emphasize the role of elites.177 This Article argues that our understanding 
of the emergence of judicial review would be improved if the role of 
ordinary citizens were brought back into the picture. Institutions are 
created as the result of both “supply” and “demand” factors. Elite 
bargaining explains institutional variation, but it does not explain why 
judicial review snowballed in importance after World War II. To 
understand why so many people in so many parts of the world entrusted so 
much power to judges, one must take into account the long-term changes 
that moved human rights to the center of constitutional discourse.178  
The second map that needs illumination is the role that constitutional 
courts play in maintaining or undermining democracy. Judicial optimists 
argue that there is an affinity between judicial review and democracy. 
They draw their examples from transitional democracies such as Germany 
after World War II or South Africa after apartheid. Judicial review can 
play an important role in new democracies by providing a public symbol 
that constitutions will henceforth be taken seriously. Judicial pessimists, 
on the other hand, sharply contest the perceived link between democratic 
success and judicial review. They draw their examples from consolidated 
democracies such as the United States. Judicial review is designed to 
prevent majorities from occasionally getting their way, so it is no surprise 
that constitutional courts can present a roadblock to solving collective 
action problems. Both optimists and pessimists, however, fail to deal 
adequately with the core issue of whether judicial review facilitates or 
erodes the values needed to sustain democracy for the long haul. The 
argument for or against judicial review should turn not on normative 
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arguments but on the role, if any, that judicial review plays in the 
construction of democracy. 
The third is that our understanding of judicial review would be 
improved if scholars were to deemphasize the U.S. experience. Lumpers 
and splitters agree on little but their disagreements illuminate the role that 
the United States plays in the comparative constitutional imagination. The 
United States has been a model and anti-model to all the world’s 
constitutional democracies.179 This Article argues that our scholarly maps 
of judicial review have for too long viewed the world through the prism of 
the exceptional United States Supreme Court. Our understanding of 
judicial review would be improved if our maps were to deemphasize and 
contextualize the U.S. experience. 
In short, the map of comparative judicial review scholarship reveals a 
series of linked, hidden maps. Any map that is of any use emphasizes 
certain features while eliminating others. Those choices are not an 
ineluctable part of the landscape that is being described but rather reveal 
the biases of the mapmaker. Comparative law scholarship would be 
enriched if it were to forthrightly address its hidden maps. Maps, after all, 
reveal the method or path of inquiry of the mapmaker. The deepest canons 
underpinning the law are the “habits of thought” that scholars share.180 To 
uncover these assumptions, comparative public law inquiry should turn 
not to comparative private law but to a broader stream of scholarship on 
democracy.181 Questions about the emergence and maintenance of 
democracy and the problematic relationship that the United States has to 
the world’s constitutional democracies lie at the root of our understanding 
of comparative judicial review.  
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